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Fighting Terror and Defending Freedom:
The Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis
Daniel J. Mitchell1
The attacks on September 11, 2001, convinced policy makers that
the government needed additional tools to both deter and punish
terrorists. The USA PATRIOT Act 2 (Patriot Act) was the most visible
manifestation of this new strategy - and, other than the decision to
depose Saddam Hussein in Iraq, also perhaps the most controversial.
Supporters argue that the Patriot Act was a long-overdue modernization
of the law, while critics contend that it upset the balance between
government power and individual rights. This debate is important, but it
usually overshadows the equally critical issue of how law enforcement
resources should best be allocated.
Notwithstanding all the bickering, there appears - at least to the
outside observer - to be a wide swath of agreement in the legal
profession. Legal scholars all seem to agree that government has the right
to investigate and prosecute individuals, but that there should be
legislative and judicial oversight to ensure the protection of civil
liberties. The left and right argue over the precise boundaries of these
principles, to be sure, which is why certain aspects of the Patriot Act
have aroused so much debate.
Not enough attention is given, however, to the effective use of law
enforcement resources. Many of the legal reforms in the Patriot Act
ostensibly were enacted to make America safer by increasing the
government's ability to catch terrorists, ideally before they strike. But
there is more than one way to increase the government's ability to win
the war against terrorism. Tilting the balance between government power
and individual rights is one option, but similar results can be achieved if
the government can more effectively deploy existing resources.
1. Any views or opinions presented in this article are solely those of Daniel J.
Mitchell, Ph.D. and do not necessarily represent those of The Heritage Foundation.
2. United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272.
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Cost-Benefit Analysis
Law enforcement policy should include cost-benefit analysis so that
resources are best allocated to protect life, liberty, and property. This
should not be a controversial proposition. Cost-benefit analysis may not
be a conscious decision, but it already is part of the public policy
process. For instance, few people would think it is acceptable for a city
of ten million to have just one police officer. Yet it is also true that few
would want that city to have five million police officers. In other words,
there is a point where additional law enforcement expenditures - both
public and private - exceed the likely benefits. Every government makes
such decisions.
Cost-benefit analysis applies to aggregate resource allocation
choices, such as how many police officers to employ in a city, but also to
how a given level of resources is utilized. In other words, since there are
not unlimited resources, it makes sense to allocate those resources in
ways that yield the greatest benefit. On a practical level, city officials
must decide how many officers to put on each shift, how many officers
to assign to different neighborhoods, and how many officers to allocate
to each type of crime. The same issues apply in the war against terrorism.
Officials must decide not only on the level of resources devoted to
fighting terrorism, but they also must make allocation decisions between,
say, human intelligence and electronic surveillance.
Assessing the Patriot Act
Cost-benefit analysis is not the only tool to judge law enforcement
policy. Nor should it necessarily rank above other concerns. To cite an
absurd example, imagine that there was solid evidence that arbitrarily
detaining all left-handed people would reduce crime rates and increase
national economic output. A strict utilitarian approach using cost-benefit
analysis might justify that decision, but it would clearly violate other
principles - not to mention conflict with numerous provisions of the
Constitution.
Even with this caveat, applying cost-benefit analysis to the Patriot
Act is a complicated exercise. How does one quantify the benefits of a
free society? How does one measure the costs and benefits of legal
reforms? What is a benchmark of success in the battle against terrorism?
This paper is not going to even try and answer these difficult questions.
Instead, it will focus on the more narrow issues of whether, based on
cost-benefit analysis, the Patriot Act moves policy in the right direction.
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The role of international charities will provide a specific case study.
Despite the controversy, it is not clear that the Patriot Act gives the
government vast new powers. Much of the law is designed to modernize
existing laws to reflect both changes in technology and the existence of
new threats. For instance:
" The law extends the use of surveillance to additional
terrorist offenses.'
" The law allows "roving wiretaps" to target the
communications of an individual rather than just the
communications of that individual on a particular
telephone .4
* The law allows law enforcement to obtain cross-
jurisdictional search warrants. 5
* The law allows investigators to access business records to
investigate terrorism-related offenses.
6
The government argues that these provisions, and others like them,
do not change the fundamental relationship between individuals and
government. 7 Some private-sector experts support this position. 8 Simply
stated, it is difficult to argue that Americans are losing important
freedoms if an existing tool is being extended so that it covers a new
technology or a new crime. And if the modernization of the law makes it
more likely that law enforcement will catch or deter terrorists, then these
provisions of the Patriot Act make sense from a cost-benefit perspective.
On the "cost" side, these laws presumably do not increase the cost
of investigating and prosecuting terrorists. Indeed, it is likely that law
enforcement costs will be marginally reduced since many of the reforms
in the Patriot Act, such as the roving wiretap and cross-jurisdictional
search warrant, will reduce time spent on bureaucratic procedures.
3. United States Department of Justice, The USA PATRIOT Act: Preserving Life
and Liberty, available at http://www.lifeandliberty.gov/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2005).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. United States Department of Justice, Dispelling the Myths, available at
http://www.lifeandliberty.gov/subs/umyths.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2005).
8. Paul Rosenzweig, Civil Liberty and the Response to Terrorism, 42 DUQ. L. REv.,
663 (2004).
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On the "benefit" side, the government claims that the law has
helped fight the battle against terrorism. 9 In the absence of peer-reviewed
academic research, it is difficult to determine whether these claims are
accurate. Nor does the Department of Justice draw a clear link between
its stated achievements and the reforms in the Patriot Act - though
another publication does list investigations that have been facilitated by
the new law. 10 Cynics may plausibly argue that the government is
exaggerating the benefits of the Patriot Act, but it is not unreasonable to
think that the provisions in the bill will marginally boost the success of
law enforcement.
Anti-Money Laundering Laws
Extending existing law enforcement tools may not alter the
relationship between individuals and the state, but this does not
necessarily mean that resources are being effectively deployed. Anti-
money laundering laws are a good example. Critics have long argued that
these laws impose heavy costs and generate few benefits. The Bush
White House agreed and proposals to ease the regulatory burden were
being reviewed during the Administration's first year." But in the
aftermath of September 11, 2001, policy makers were interested only in
policies that theoretically might enhance the war against terror. As a
result, anti-money laundering laws were expanded as part of the Patriot
Act.
But while anti-money laundering laws theoretically help the war
against terror, this does not mean that they necessarily are justified by
cost-benefit analysis. A relatively new book from the Institute for
International Economics, Chasing Dirty Money: The Fight Against
Money Laundering, strongly supports anti-money laundering laws and
advocates their expansion. But the authors admit that these laws imposed
costs of $7 billion in 2003, yet they admitted that
[w]hile the number of suspicious activity reports filed has risen rapidly in
recent years... total seizures and forfeitures amount to an extremely small
9. United States Department of Justice, Waging the War on Terror, available at
http://www.lifeandliberty.gov/subs/ajterr.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2005).
10. United States Department of Justice, Report from the Field: The USA PATRIOT
Act at Work, available at http://www.lifeandliberty.gov/docs/071304 re-
port-from-the-field.pdf.
11. Adam Wasch, Administration Cautions Senators On Risks of Banning Certain
Accounts, Bureau of National Affairs, March 7, 2001, available at
http://www.freedomandprosperity.org/Articles/bna03-07-01/bnaO3-07-01 .shtml
[Vol. 25:219
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol25/iss2/3
2005] FIGHTING TERROR AND DEFENDING FREEDOM 223
sum (approximately $700 million annually in the United States) when
compared with the crude estimates of the total amounts laundered.
Moreover, there has not been an increase in the number of federal
convictions for money laundering.'
2
The private sector bears most of the cost of anti-money laundering
laws, but the authors also note that, "Budgetary costs for AML laws have
tripled in the last 20 years for prevention and quadrupled for
enforcement."13
The key question, of course, is whether these costs are matched by
concomitant benefits. The answer almost certainly is no. As indicated in
the preceding paragraph, the government seizes very little dirty money.
There are only about 2,000 convictions for federal money laundering
offenses each year, and that number falls by more than 50 percent not
counting cases where money laundering was an add-on charge to another
offense. 14
Other nations also seem to have trouble making effective use of
anti-money laundering laws. An article in Dissent contains the following
grim statistics:
Attempts to find laundered funds are usually dismal failures. According to
Interpol, $3 billion in dirty money has been seized in twenty years of
struggle against money laundering-about the amount laundered in three
days. U.S. Treasury officials say 99.9 percent of the foreign criminal and
terrorist money presented for deposit in the United States gets into secure
accounts. That means anti-money-laundering efforts fail 99.9 percent of the
time.15
The problem, at least in part, is that the current system relies on
indiscriminate data collection. This collects a haystack of data, so it
should come as no surprise that law enforcement squanders considerable
resources searching for the needle of criminal activity. A former member
of the European Parliament explains that war against crime and terror
would be more effective if law enforcement could focus on criminal
activity:
12. Peter Reuter & Edwin M. Truman, CHASING DIRTY MONEY: THE FIGHT
AGAINST MONEY LAUNDERING, INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS (2004),
available at http://www.iie.com/publications/chapters-preview/381/ 1iie3705.pdf (last
visited Mar. 31, 2005).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Lucy Komisar, Offshore Banking: The Secret Threat to America, DISSENT
(Spring 2003), available at http://www.dissentmagazine.org/menutest/articles/sp03/
komisar.htm.
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There are two quite distinct approaches to this task. One starts at the other
end of the chain - the generality of citizens - and seeks to sift through the
events of daily life to identify criminal activity. Another focuses on
terrorists, criminals or suspected terrorists or criminals themselves, and
attempts to identify, pursue and prosecute them: the 'interdiction'
approach. The first approach is obviously less focused, more labour
intensive and more likely to raise problems of invasion of privacy, clogging
of systems and interference with the lives of honest citizens.
An article in the Journal of Financial Crime reached a similar
conclusion, noting that anti-money laundering laws "often focus on
process rather than results [and that there] is very little cost-benefit
analysis and very little discussion of whether law enforcement resources
are being effectively utilized."1 7 A column in the London Times noted
that the current system "makes the obligation of public authorities
passive: in this model they await reports from bank managers,
accountants, lawyers and other professionals, rather than taking active
steps to deploy crime-fighters to identify, pursue and indict criminals., 18
A Dismal Record
Statistics only tell part of the story. Even more damning is the first-
hand testimony of those who are familiar with the system. An article in
Reason has a less than flattering appraisal of anti-money laundering laws
from a former law enforcement official:
"I consider all these measures to be highly counterproductive," says John
Yoder, director of the Justice Department's Asset Forfeiture Office in the
Reagan administration. "It costs more to enforce and regulate them than the
benefits that are received. You're getting so much data on people who are
absolutely legitimate and who are doing nothing wrong. There's just so
much paperwork out there that it's really not a targeted effort. You have
investigators running around chasing innocent people, trying to find
something that they're doing wrong, rather than targeting real criminals."' 19
The same article also cited a former agent with the Federal Bureau
16. Graham Mather, Policing of Financial Transactions, European Policy Forum,
Dec. 22, 2003.
17. Daniel Mitchell, US Government Agencies Confirm that Low-Tax Jurisdictions
are not Money Laundering Centers, available at http://www.freedomandprosperity.org/
Papers/blacklist/blacklist.shtml (Jan. 2002).
18. Graham Mather, Money-Laundering Fight Could Hit the Wrong Targets, TIMEs
(UK), Oct. 2, 2001.
19. John Berlau, Show Us Your Money, REASON, Nov. 2003.
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of Investigation:
Oliver "Buck" Revell, a highly decorated 30-year veteran of the FBI who
supervised the bureau's counterterrorism division in the 1980s and '90s,
agrees that the sheer volume of data generated by these measures can
overwhelm law enforcement efforts. "You can be buried in an avalanche of
information," Revell says. "The total volume of activity makes it very
difficult to track and trace any type of specific information.
20
These sentiments are echoed by one of America's top financial
consultants. In an article about the Patriot Act, anti-money laundering
laws, and the fight against terrorism, Bert Ely wrote:
The legislation's premise is false, on two grounds. First, the authorities
have consistently failed to use existing laws effectively to detect criminal
behavior before-the-fact. Second, even with this additional police power,
the authorities will still not be able to identify terrorists before they strike
nor shut off their funding. In fact, the new law and its accompanying
regulations will provide future terrorists with a highly detailed road map of
how to avoid detection.
21
Other experts - even those who are ideologically sympathetic to
anti-money laundering laws - reach the same conclusion. A recent
Washington Post story explained:
Charles Intriago, a former prosecutor who publishes Miami-based Money
Laundering Alert puts it bluntly: "Bottom line: It's a piece of cake [for a
terrorist or other criminal] to move $10 million into this country.".. .But
even final rules won't provide a "how-to" manual on what to look for,
critics say. "There's no meaningful guidance from government for the
financial industry on how to detect and report terrorist financing," said
Joseph M. Myers, a lawyer who in January stepped down as a career staffer
on the White House's National Security Council, where he was the day-to-
day coordinator among various federal agencies on the terrorism financing
issue.
22
Not surprisingly, the financial services industry does not relish
being deputies for the government. This is not only because they bear the
lion's share of the cost for anti-money laundering laws, but also because
it forces banks and other financial institutions to adopt an adversary
20. Id.
21. Bert Ely, Money Laundering Laws Won't Stop International Terrorism, in THE
PRIVACY PAPERS, May 29, 2002, available at http://www.freecongress.org/commentaries/
2002/020529be.asp (last visited May 18, 2005).
22. Kathleen Day & Terrence O'Hara, Obstacles Block Tracking of Terror
Funding, WASH. POST, July 14, 2004, at E-01.
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relationship with customers. 2 3 But while bankers find anti-money
laundering laws bad for business and ineffective, they are reluctant to
publicly resist. As noted by the Economist:
No banker present challenged Mr Aufhauser, although some balked at the
notion of treating all customers as potential criminals. Most banks these
days do not voice such views openly for fear of being accused of not doing
their bit to cut off al-Qaeda's sources of money. In private, however,
bankers with long experience of financial crime say that many of the rules
introduced since September 1 th to keep terrorists out of the mainstream
financial system will not achieve their aim. And in the end, customers will
pay more for banking, because of the high cost of making detailed checks.
The heart of the problem, from the banks' point of view, is that the vast
majority of financial transactions look (and are) so routine and prosaic.
America's Federal Bureau of Investigation recently tried to design a profile
of how terrorists might use a bank. It failed to come up with any more
unusual activity than placing a big deposit and then withdrawing cash in a
series of small amounts. That profile, the anti-money-launderin 4boss at a
big American bank points out, fits a quarter of banks' customers.
Anti-money laundering laws present enough of a challenge when
dealing with criminals who are trying to turn "dirty" money into "clean"
money. Bankers have an even bigger problem when dealing with
terrorists, who usually start with "clean" money and have evil plans. A
Reuters dispatch outlines the problem:
U.S. banks struggling with tough new laws to spot terrorist financing say
they will be groping around in the dark until government officials provide
more intelligence to narrow the search. Bankers, experts and industry
advocates say that unlike money laundering-which dominated dirty
money searches before the Sept. 11 attacks-terrorist cash flow has no
unique characteristics that would help banks spot, track or avoid it .... One
government official said on condition of anonymity: "You're looking for a
needle in a haystack. Unless you already know who the terrorists are, it's
hard to figure out what would be a distinguishing birthmark. There aren't
any .... In all seriousness, I haven't seen any typology that says: this is a
red flag for terrorism," said one senior official at a large U.S. bank. "The
only way so far that we can think of to identify terrorist financing is for the
government to identify who the terrorists are. 25
23. Bob Barr, Unfiendly Bankers, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Oct. 16, 2003.
24. The Needle in the Haystack, ECONOMIST, Dec. 12, 2002. available at
http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfin?StoryID= 1492146.
25. Caroline Drees, US banks struggle to spot 'terrorist financing,' REUTERS, Mar.
9, 2004, available at http://www.forbes.com/business/newswire/2004/03/O9/rtr1291602.
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All of these examples indicate that anti-money laundering laws may
be inherently dysfunctional. Simply stated, it does not make sense to
superficially spy on all financial transactions. Instead, law enforcement
would be more successful if government - and its unofficial deputies in
the private sector - focused on likely wrongdoers. But this choice also
would require cost-benefit analysis. As this Associated Press story
indicates, it is unclear that government makes very wise decisions even
when resources are targeted against illegal activity:
The Treasury Department agency entrusted with blocking the financial
resources of terrorists has assigned five times as many agents to investigate
Cuban embargo violations as it has to track Osama bin Laden's and
Saddam Hussein's money, documents show. In addition, the Office of
Foreign Assets Control said that between 1990 and 2003 it opened just 93
enforcement investigations related to terrorism. Since 1994 it has collected
just $9,425 in fines for terrorism financing violations. In contrast, OFAC
opened 10,683 enforcement investigations since 1990 for possible
violations of the long-standing economic embargo against Fidel Castro's
regime, and collected more than $8 million in fines since 1994, mostly
from people who sent money to, did business with or traveled to Cuba
without permission.6
By themselves, the aforementioned anecdotes might not be terribly
damning, but they are worrisome when there is scant evidence that anti-
money laundering laws fail to deter or hinder crime. This does not mean
that there is no benefit or that the laws do not raise the cost of laundering
funds - thus presumably deterring some criminal activity. But it does
suggest that the current system is not an effective use of resources.
A Positive Reform
Anti-money laundering laws generally are not very effective, but
there has been at least one encouraging development. As part of the
Patriot Act, Section 314(a) creates a targeted information request. This
feature, sometimes known as the "pointer program," allows government
to make requests seeking information about specific individuals
suspected of terrorism and money laundering.27 According to a
html.
26. John Solomon, More Agents Track Castro than Bin Laden, Assoc. PREss, Apr.
30, 2004.
27. Stuart A. Levey, Under Secretary, Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, U.S.
Department of the Treasury, Testimony, Senate Committee on Banking and Urban
Affairs, Sept. 29, 2004, available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/
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description from the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN):
[T]he rule establishes a mechanism for law enforcement to provide
financial institutions with the names of specific suspects, something that
would not have likely have occurred on the same magnitude without such a
mechanism. Because financial institutions will be required to report back to
FinCEN any matches based on such suspect information, law enforcement
will have an added incentive to share information with the financial
community.
28
The law has earned positive comments from law enforcement
officials. 29 A 2003 report from the FinCEN includes the following
favorable comments:
" An ICE Officer wrote, "314(a) information provided by the
FI was pivotal to the investigation." 
30
* An IRS Special Agent said, "314(a) information helped the
case tremendously. Accounts not previously known were
identified and points of contact at the bank were
established." 3'
* Another IRS Agent said, "314(a) process is great and
valuable. The information request identified domestic
account activity previously unknown." The agent said he
would definitely use the process again.32
" An FBI agent said, "I think the system is fantastic. In all my
government years, I really haven't seen a system work this
efficiently. I was able to identify over 40 accounts for my
subject. I don't think I would have been able to identify
some of these accounts without this mechanism.,
33
jsl 965.htm?IMAGE.X=31\&IMAGE.Y=15.
28. Department of the Treasury, Special Information Sharing Procedures
To Deter Money Laundering and Terrorist Activity, Final Rule 31 C.F.R. Part 103,
RIN 1506-AA27, available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/docs/314finalrule.pdf'?
IMAGE.X=3 1\&IMAGE.Y=1 5.
29. Stuart A. Levey, Under Secretary, Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, U.S.
Department of the Treasury, Testimony, Senate Committee on Banking, and Urban
Affairs, Sept. 29, 2004, available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js1965.htm?
IMAGE.X=3 1\&IMAGE.Y=1 5.
30. Bank Secrecy Act Advisory Group US Department of the Treasury, SAR
Activity Review 6, Nov. 2003, available at http://www.fincen.gov/sarreviewissue6.pdf.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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These reports, to be sure, should be taken with a grain of salt. After
all, FinCEN is in charge of the program and clearly has an interest in
publicizing favorable information. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that it
is difficult to find similarly favorable remarks about the value of data
collected by traditional anti-money laundering rules. Currency
transaction reports (CTRs), which mandate automatic filings for
transactions of $10,000 and above, and suspicious activity reports
(SARs), which require discretionary filings for unusual transactions,
have a less-than-stellar track record.34
Interestingly, the Pointer Program matches very closely with the
recommendations of the Task Force on Information Exchange and
Financial Privacy. Chaired by former Senator Mack Mattingly and
advised by former Attorney General Ed Meese, the Task Force of
lawyers, economists, and former law enforcement officials was quite
critical of conventional anti-money laundering regulations. But the Task
Force also endorsed a more targeted approach:
The last thing that would be constructive in the effort to apprehend
terrorists and criminals would be to generate even more untargeted reports
by, as has been proposed, reducing the reporting threshold or broadening
the reporting network. To rationalize the effort to apprehend terrorists and
criminals, the current CTR and SAR system should be replaced. Instead,
the authorities should generate a confidential "watch list" consisting of
individuals and organizations (and their known aliases, identifying numbers
and addresses) about which there is reasonable and significant suspicion of
involvement in terrorism, other threats to national security or serious
crimes.
35
The Pointer Program, to be sure, does not replace other anti-money
laundering rules and regulations. Nonetheless, at least 314(a) targets
those who may be involved in criminal activity. And law enforcement
plays an active rather than passive role. Last but not least, it seems to
yield results. According to a government report, 270 requests have
helped identify 1,508 unknown accounts. That's the good news. The bad
news is that the government also admits that this process generated only
9 arrests and 2 indictments.36
34. Task Force on Information Exchange and Financial Privacy, Report on
Financial Privacy, Law Enforcement, and Terrorism, Mar. 25, 2002, available at
http://www.freedomandprosperity.org/task-force-report.pdf.
35. Id.
36. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, FinCEN's 314(a) Fact Sheet, Jan. 26,
2005, available at http://www.fincen.gov/314afactsheetO12605.pdf
11
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It also is worth noting that the Pointer program has generated
criticism from some quarters. The financial services industry certainly
does not appreciate the imposition of new costs - particularly since
314(a) requests are in addition to other regulatory burdens. And some
civil liberties organizations are uncomfortable with the government's
ability to focus on particular individuals. But the Pointer program
approach at least is based on a common sense approach that it is better to
focus a lot on the few people who are sinister rather than spying a little
bit on everybody.
International Charities
As part of its anti-terrorist financing guidelines, the government has
suggested a "voluntary" set of guidelines for charities.37 These unofficial
regulations impose a number of reporting and bookkeeping requirements
on charities, ostensibly to ensure that they do not become - even
unwittingly - conduits for contributions to terrorist organizations. This is
part of a broader effort by the government to monitor the actions of
Muslim-oriented nonprofit organizations.38
Not surprisingly, these new guidelines and scrutiny have attracted
criticism from the Muslim community, as have some enforcement
actions against Islamic charities. 39 The Administration denies targeting
Muslim charities, asserting that its efforts "are not in any way intended to
impede, restrict or scrutinize legitimate charitable giving. Indeed, the
promotion of both faith-based and secular charitable giving is a central
goal of this Administration. ''4
Cost-benefit analysis is the missing part of this debate. Ideally, the
federal government should demonstrate that these supposedly voluntary
37. Department of Treasury, U.S. Department Of Treasury Anti-Terrorist Financing
Guidelines: Voluntary Best Practices For U.S.-Based Charities, available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/po36072.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2005).
38. Juan Carlos Zarate, Assistant Secretary, Terrorist Financing and Financial
Crimes, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Testimony to the House Financial Services
Committee Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js2256.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2005).
39. Council on American-Islamic Relations, Freeze on Group 's Assets Questioned
by US. Muslims, Dec. 4, 2001, available at http://www.cair-net.org/default.asp?
Page=articleView&id=53 1 &theType=NR.
40. Department of Treasury, Response to Inquiries from Arab American and
American Muslim Communities for Guidance on Charitable Best Practices, Nov. 7,
2002., available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/po3607.htm.
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guidelines will yield benefits that exceed the combined costs to taxpayers
and the nonprofit sector. The anti-terrorist financing guidelines will mean
more regulation and bureaucracy. The costs to taxpayers may not be
large, but it will impose a burden on charities.
To be sure, the guidelines do not impose onerous requirements.
Indeed, many of the recordkeeping and reporting requirements should
present very little problem for well-run charitable organizations. But on
the other hand, it is also appropriate to ask whether there is any reason to
think these guidelines will hinder charities that want to aid terrorists?
A comparison of the Pointer Program and other anti-money
laundering policies should be a road map. Guidelines, reporting
requirements, and other obligations imposed on large populations are
unlikely to be effective. As discussed above, collecting too much
information means looking for a needle in a haystack. Making the
haystack bigger may complicate the job of law enforcement in addition
to raising privacy concerns.
This does not mean that Islamic charities should not play a role in
the battle against terrorism. While charities do not exist to act as deputies
of law enforcement, there is an obligation to fight evil. This means
avoiding contact with or assistance to designated individuals and entities.
It also means a moral obligation to cooperate with investigations and
prosecutions.
Finally, there is the issue of profiling. While beyond the scope of
this paper, cost-benefit analysis presumably would justify the targeting of
law enforcement resources against a subset of the population that -
empirically speaking - shares certain characteristics with 100 percent of
the terrorists that attacked America. The key question, of course, is
where to draw the line. Clearly it would be impermissible to travel down
the path of Rooseveltian detention camps, not to mention grossly unfair
to the vast majority of American Muslims that have no sympathy for
terrorism. But would it also be impermissible for the Federal Bureau of
Investigation to spend more time investigating - based on their shares of
the U.S. population - Muslims compared to Jews? As one author argued:
One unchallengeable fact of the war on terrorism is that the enemy consists
overwhelmingly of radical Muslims. To defeat al Qaeda inside the United
States, domestic terrorist fighters must find the Muslim terrorist cells,
penetrate them, and then destroy them. Fishing through financial records
will not flag those cells, particularly as future terrorists become more
effective in covering their financial tracks. Instead, the search for the
terrorists' cells must start where they incubate-in the minority of Muslim
13
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mosques, cultural centers, and similar gathering spots where hatred of
America is fomented.
4 1
Conclusion
The issues raised in this paper show that there is no substitute for
traditional methods of investigation. Anti-terrorist activities are more
likely to be effective when targeted against those who have come to the
attention of authorities for various reasons, including bribery and
surveillance. Whether focused on banks or charities, indiscriminate
information-collecting exercises should play a secondary role. John
Berlau's Reason article provides a useful summary:
Have we gotten more security during the last 30 years in exchange for the
privacy we've sacrificed? Looking specifically at the BSA and other bank
surveillance measures, prominent experts in law enforcement, national
security, and technology say the answer is no. The record of FinCEN, the
agency that was charged with tracking terrorist financing prior to 9/11,
seems to vindicate their arguments. The lack of success with the financial
information that the government has long been collecting does not bode
well for more-ambitious data dredging plans. Indeed, experience suggests
that piling up more data could make it harder to zero in on terrorists. 4
In a 1974 dissent in California Bankers Association v. Schultz,
Justice Douglas argued that the Fourth Amendment should protect
financial records.43 He was unsuccessful, but he accurately warned that
this created the proverbial slippery slope: "It would be highly useful to
government espionage to have reports from all our bookstores, all our
hardware and retail stores, all our drugstores ... What one buys at the
hardware and retail stores may furnish clues to potential uses of wires,
soap powders, and the like used by criminals." 44
41. Ely, supra note 21.
42. Berlau, supra note 19.
43. 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
44. Id. at 84-85.
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